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REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 
 
 
VINCENT OOI* 
 
Academic discussion of justice and taxation has focused on determining the moral limits 
of taxation. This article is concerned specifically with the moral limits on the 
redistributivity of taxation. Rawlsian principles enable us to determine the moral upper 
and lower bounds of redistribution through tax and transfer systems. However, major 
changes since Rawls and Nozick prompt a re-examination of these bounds in the modern 
context. Increased affluence means that for many societies the worst-off citizens are well-
off in absolute terms. Increased immigration and emigration means that the classical 
model of a closed society is now obsolete. I consider the basis for the taxation of citizens, 
permanent residents and immigrants based on associative and contractarian models of 
obligation. The increasing prevalence of incorporation and other legal persons requires 
a development of the traditional model. Building on the taxation of trusts, I propose a 
hybrid model between personification and transparency for corporations.  
 
 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
 
A redistributive tax and transfer system involves the financing of state expenditure 
via the mandatory extraction of wealth from individuals, and hence can be argued 
to be prima facie violation of property rights.1 Broadly speaking, the key feature of 
                                                      
* BA (Oxford) (Double First), Research Assistant, Centre for Law & Business, Faculty of 
Law, National University of Singapore. I am very grateful to the Centre for Law & Business 
for providing funding and support in research assistance. I would also like to thank 
Glendon Goh for his exceptionally capable research assistance on this project. 
1 Property rights and taxation have been extensively discussed in academic literature. In 
their highly influential work, The Myth of Ownership, Murphy and Nagel argue that since 
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a redistributive tax and transfer system is that an individual’s net gain from the 
system decreases as their income rises. On one hand, it may be considered to be 
inequitable and unjust, since the system does not extract the same amount of tax 
from each individual in society. On the other hand, however, a non-redistributive 
tax and transfer system seems just as unjust: it ignores the deleterious effects of 
significant inequality, and imposes what seems like unfair burdens on the worst-
off in society. 
I believe that there is some merit to the arguments both for and against the 
redistributivity of tax and transfer systems. The aim in this article is to consider 
these arguments by grounding them in Rawlsian principles. It is proposed that 
there are strong arguments for choosing to ground tax and transfer systems in 
Rawlsian principles and I will show that they are appropriate for governing the 
social institutions of a well-ordered society. I will also show that tax and transfer 
systems must be distributive to at least some extent in practice.  
There also seem to be strong arguments against redistributive tax and transfer 
systems that are grounded on Rawlsian principles. These arguments can largely be 
attributed to Rawls’ main rival Nozick, and will be addressed as well. Nozickian 
principles suggest that there must be limitations on the extent to which tax and 
transfer systems are redistributive. Considering the works of these two great 
philosophers together, it would seem that a (predominantly) Rawlsian conception 
of a just society does impose upper and lower bounds on the extent to which tax 
and transfer systems should be redistributive. Societies may not establish tax and 
                                                      
taxation is a key part of defining property rights, any property claims can only be made on 
post-tax property. (See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 106-107). The core ideas seem to have 
their roots in classical works like Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
The Social Contract. Penner has argued strongly against Murphy and Nagel’s conclusion, 
pointing out that the notion of taxation itself prevents us from denying the independent 
validity of private entitlements. The claim of the taxing authority must be regarded as a 
demand for some value which rightfully belongs to the taxpayer prior to the claim (see 
James E Penner, “Misled by 'Property” (2005) 18 Can J L & Jurisprudence 75 at 86-91). 
While I incline towards Penner’s view, the theoretical nature of property rights and taxation 
is not the only factor that needs to be considered. Simester and Chan caution that “pre-tax 
ownership may in truth be a myth, but it is so pervasive a myth that it has the grip of social 
fact. The law, as a working social institution, cannot simply ignore it.” (See A P Simester 
& Winnie Chan, “On Tax and Justice”, (2003) 23 OJLS 711 at 725).  
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transfer systems that are either overly or insufficiently redistributive in such a way 
so as to transgress these bounds. Within these bounds that apply to all societies, 
however, the redistributivity of tax and transfer systems is a matter for individual 
societies to determine based on their specific circumstances and so as to advance 
their own objectives.  
Having considered the traditional model of justice and taxation through a 
theoretical discussion about the redistributivity of tax and transfer systems, I will 
then consider three ways in which our modern world has changed from the time 
of Rawls and Nozick: (1) increased affluence; (2) increased immigration and 
emigration; and (3) incorporation. I will argue that the traditional model of justice 
and taxation is still relevant in the modern context, but we need to build on that 
framework; it has not kept up-to-date with recent developments. In attempting to 
update and refine the traditional model, I will draw on ideas from political theory, 
tax law, company law and the law of trusts. The end result will be a comprehensive 
model of justice and taxation which can cater to the complexities of the modern 
world.  
 
II.      DEFINITIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS 
 
In this article, redistribution refers to the transfer of the wealth of individuals in a 
society by the state. Since both taxes and benefits are relevant to wealth, we have 
to consider the combined effect of all taxes and benefits on an individual’s wealth. 
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I note that in general, tax policies are formulated based on policy and economic 
considerations including administrative efficiency,2 horizontal and vertical equity,3 
and political feasibility. A complete assessment of redistributive taxation, however, 
also requires a discussion of moral and philosophical considerations. In this article 
I will restrict the discussion to those considerations that stem from moral and 
political philosophy. In the interests of space, I will focus mainly on explaining and 
defending Rawls’ principles of justice in the next section, before commenting in 
subsequent sections on what these principles imply about the extent to which a 
well-ordered society’s tax and transfer system should be redistributive. 
 
III.      THE RAWLSIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE 
 
A.      Rawlsian Principles of Distributive Justice 
 
We begin with the set of principles that Rawls believes should govern social 
institutions. Rawls’ key idea is that “the most fundamental idea in our conception 
of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from 
one generation to the next.”4 Rawls argues that such a society must comprise “free 
and equal” citizens and be “well-ordered”5 or effectively regulated by a public 
                                                      
2 See J Tiley & G Loutzenhiser, Revenue Law, 7th ed (London: Hart Publishing, 2012) at 
para 1.3.5. The impact of administrative efficiency and economic growth is particularly 
difficult to predict. An extensive study by Dilnot has shown that gains from these factors 
actually make it possible for an increase in the effective tax base, even when proportionate 
or regressive tax structure are used. (See A Dilnot “The Income Tax Rate Structure” in 
Sandford ed, Key Issues in Tax Reform (Birmingham: Fiscal Publications, 1998) at 9-21). 
This leads to a complication of the Rawlsian framework, since it raises the question of 
whether it may be permissible to deviate from Rawls’ general principles temporarily if the 
effect would be to grow the tax base significantly, benefitting the whole of society in 
accordance with his principles in the long run. Dilnot’s study has shown that this is a 
difficult issue often faced by developing countries, but an extensive discussion of the 
temporary suspension of Rawlsian principles is beyond the scope of this article.  
3 Tiley & Loutzenhiser, supra note 2 at para 1.3.2. 
4 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) at 5 [Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”]. 
5 Ibid. 
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conception of justice. He presents two principles of justice to specify the terms of 
this fair system of cooperation that constitutes an ideal society. These principles 
are “to specify the basic rights and duties to be assigned by the main political and 
social institutions” as well as “to regulate the division of benefits arising from social 
cooperation and allot the burdens necessary to sustain it.”6 The first principle, 
concerning rights and duties that arise from institutions, bears on tax and transfer 
systems, which are institutions that guarantee rights by conferring benefits and 
impose duties in the form of tax burdens. The second principle regulates the 
division of benefits and burdens, hence bearing on the manner in which taxes and 
transfers are distributed. Clearly then, Rawls’ two principles have significant 
implications for what constitutes a just tax and transfer system. 
 
1. The first principle of justice 
 
The first principle of justice concerns basic liberties. It stipulates that “each person 
has the same indefeasible claim to a full adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, 
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”7 Rawls’ 
broad claim about the existence of fundamental liberties is relatively 
uncontroversial, but there is significant disagreement about the content of these 
liberties. Given this, I will refrain from commenting on specific issues of what 
constitutes a right, and instead discuss fundamental liberties in broad terms as well 
as those specific rights, such as the right to legal due process, on which there is 
significant consensus.  
 
2. The second principle of justice 
 
The second principle of justice concerns social and economic inequalities, and 
requires that two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that these 
inequalities can only be “attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity” [FEO]. In other words, socio-economic 
                                                      
6 Ibid at 7. 
7 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 42. 
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inequalities are impermissible unless all members of society have a fair chance of 
accessing the offices and positions that confer these unequal benefits on their 
occupants. Socio-economic privileges should not be arbitrarily distributed, but 
should instead be tied to offices and positions whose occupants are selected solely 
“on the basis of qualities and efforts reasonably related to the relevant duties and 
tasks.”8 These offices and positions must not only be formally open to all members 
of society, but must also be equally accessible to all those who are similarly 
motivated and endowed, regardless of their socio-economic background.  
As Bird-Pollan argues, FEO is hence not merely a formal freedom, but must be 
a substantive right, because one cannot fully exercise the formal freedom to 
compete for offices and positions if one has significantly fewer material goods as 
compared to one’s peers.9 For Rawls, it would be unjust for socio-economic 
inequalities to be distributed across individuals based on factors, such as their social 
background, over which they have no control. The Rawlsian condition that 
inequalities are justified only under FEO is intended to avoid precisely this unjust 
distribution. In practice, Rawls suggests that “a certain set of institutions that 
assures similar chances of education”10 is needed to guarantee FEO.  
The second condition requires that socio-economic inequalities “are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society” (the difference 
                                                      
8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 245-
246 [Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”]. Rawls’ conception of FEO does seem to bear certain 
similarities to the concept of meritocracy. However, the two concepts are distinct and Rawls 
did actually expressly clarify the differences between the two (see Rawls, “A Theory of 
Justice” at 106. In particular, Rawls was concerned about certain “undesirable features of 
meritocracies” which he thought were incompatible with the concept of FEO (see Norman 
Daniels, ‘Merit and Meritocracy’, (1978) 7:3 Phil & Pub Aff 206-223). 
9 Jennifer Bird-Pollan, “Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity, and Wealth 
Transfer Taxation” (2013) 59 Wayne L Rev 713 at 724-725. Bird-Pollan then develops 
the principle further and argues that the Rawlsian framework in fact requires the existence 
of a wealth transfer tax. She goes on to propose how this wealth transfer tax should be 
designed to accord with Rawlsian principles. All this is consistent with the main thesis of 
this article, which supports redistribution of wealth within the Rawlsian framework. The 
exact mechanism of the distribution, however, is a matter of economics and politics.  
10 Ibid at 724-725. 
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principle).11 Those present members of society12 that are least advantaged in 
material terms, in other words the poorest people currently living in society, are 
what I refer to in this article as the ‘worst-off’.13 It is important to clarify here that 
the worst-off here refers to those who are least-advantaged in relative terms; hence, 
the worst-off in society may in some cases be well-off in the sense of enjoying what 
society considers to be a rather decent standard of living. 
Returning to the difference principle, Rawls argues that socio-economic 
inequalities are only legitimate if the worst-off benefit indirectly from these 
inequalities. Under FEO, those who are better-off will be those who are naturally 
endowed with valuable talents and those who lack these talents will not be worse-
off. Rawls argues that because no individual morally deserves their natural 
endowments, individuals who are better-off are only justified in benefiting from 
their natural endowments if the worst-off in society also benefit, albeit indirectly, 
from such inequalities. In other words, as Elkins notes, what the difference 
                                                      
11 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 42-43. 
12 Rawls does not consider members of future generations as among the ‘worst off’. Instead, 
his model focuses only on people who are members of society at present, relying on a 
separate Just Savings Principle to consider the problem of future generations (see Rawls, “A 
Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 253-254). The question of intergenerational justice has 
been discussed at some length by academics building on the work of Rawls in this area. See 
Meyer & Lukas, “Intergenerational Justice” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed 
by Edward N Zalta (2015), online: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-
intergenerational/>; Steven Wall, “Just Savings and the Difference Principle” (2003) 116:1 
Philosophical Studies at 79-102; and Roger Payden, “Rawls’s Just Savings Principle and 
the Sense of Justice” (1997) 23:1 Soc Theory & Prac at 27-51. 
13 A few clarifications on the notion of the ‘worst-off’ may be necessary here. I agree with 
and will adopt Freeman’s interpretation of Rawls as being willing to include people who 
voluntarily choose not to work as among those who are ‘worst off’ in society, with the 
caveat that the support they receive from society should be proportionately reduced on 
account of their voluntary unemployment (see Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: 
Routledge, 2007) at 229-230). I also agree with Dworkin, who interprets Rawls as defining 
the ‘worst off’ in purely economic terms such that individuals with natural handicaps do 
not automatically fall within this group (see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2000) at 113). It is acknowledged that it may 
be slightly myopic to consider things in purely economic terms. However, it is necessary to 
adopt a definition that fits well with what we are discussing, in this case, taxation. In this 
context, economic well-being has to be the focus of the inquiry, other perspectives being 
outside the scope of this article.  
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principle states is that the wealth of the better-off is justified only to the extent that 
it contributes to the welfare of the worst-off.14 
These principles and conditions in Rawls’ framework are structured in a 
hierarchy governed by the concept of lexical priority. A principle or condition is 
lexically prior to another principle or condition if we can only apply the latter 
principle or condition when the former principle or condition has already been 
satisfied. Hence, in considering the latter principle or condition we should assume 
that the former principle or condition is operative.  
Rawls argues that the first principle of justice is lexically prior to the second 
principle.15 In other words, “whenever the basic liberties can be effectively 
established, a lesser or an unequal liberty cannot be exchanged for an improvement 
in economic well-being.”16 What this means is that no socio-economic inequality 
is justifiable unless all members of society enjoy their basic liberties. At the 
individual level, none of an individual’s basic liberties can be substituted with 
socio-economic benefits offered to that individual. This idea of a fundamental set 
of liberties that trump economic considerations is largely uncontroversial, 
although, as noted above, the exact content of those liberties may be less clear. 
Rawls also argues that the condition of fair equality of opportunity is lexically prior 
to the difference principle.17 This implies that the effect of the inequalities justified 
by the difference principle cannot be so large as to undermine FEO.  
 
B.      Justifying the Rawlsian Principles of Justice 
 
One might ask why Rawls chose these principles of justice over alternative 
principles of making decisions as a society. A compelling alternative, for instance, 
would be the principle of average utility, under which society would make decisions 
with the objective of maximising total welfare without regard for the distribution 
                                                      
14 David Elkins, “Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory” (2006) 24:1 Yale L & 
Pol'y Rev 43 at 55. 
15 Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 220. 
16 Ibid at 132. 
17 Ibid at 220. 
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of such welfare.18 Rawls’ argument for adopting his principles over alternatives 
proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it is assumed that at birth, persons enter into society 
and do so with a given set of natural endowments as well as a given social position.19 
Therefore, citizens do not choose to enter society and do not have control over 
their starting position within society.20  
Secondly, Rawls suggests that the principles of justice should be determined by 
imagining what principles of justice would be adopted behind the veil of ignorance; 
in other words, what principles would hypothetically be adopted by people if they 
were unaware of the social position into which they would be born.21 Rawls argues 
that the process of determining what principles of justice should be adopted best 
takes place behind the veil of ignorance because the principles of justice should be 
adopted as a result of deliberations between free and equal citizens. Since citizens 
that know their relative social standing would not treat each other as equals, such 
knowledge would prejudice the outcome of deliberations on the principles of 
justice.22 Furthermore, the veil of ignorance, behind which citizens are ignorant of 
their social position, reflects the fact that citizens in society do not choose the social 
position into which they are born.23 
The final step in Rawls’ argument involves considering the criteria for selecting 
appropriate principles of justice by citizens who are behind the veil of ignorance. 
                                                      
18 This is, of course, the highly influential concept of utilitarianism, which Rawls thought 
was unable to provide a satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as 
free and equal persons, a requirement he thought to be of absolutely first importance for 
an account of democratic institutions (See Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at xi-
xii). For more on utilitarianism, see Driver & Julia, “The History of Utilitarianism” in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed by Edward N Zalta (2014), online: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/>.  
19 Rawls, supra note 8 at 86-93. 
20 Ibid at 86-93. 
21 Ibid at 118-123. 
22 Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 118-123. 
23 Ibid. While the veil of ignorance or original position is a commonly cited and generally 
accepted thought experiment, it has been legitimately criticised at times. For more on the 
veil of ignorance, see Freeman & Samuel, “Original Position” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed by Edward N Zalta (2014), online: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
original-position/>. 
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Rawls argues that in the conditions that are obtained behind the veil of ignorance, 
it would be rational for every participant or citizen to adopt the maximin criteria 
when choosing between alternative principles of justice.24 The maximin criteria or 
rule requires us to identify the worst possible outcome of each alternative and then 
to select the alternative under which the worst possible outcome is better than the 
worst possible outcomes of the other alternatives.25 Here, the requirement that the 
principles of justice are selected from behind the veil of ignorance becomes crucial. 
If citizens know their social position, then the worst possible outcomes each of 
them will face under a given set of principles of justice would differ based on the 
different social positions and traits of these citizens. However, behind the veil of 
ignorance, the worst possible outcome for every citizen is the same under a given 
set of principles of justice – it is simply the worst possible socioeconomic position 
permitted by that set of principles of justice.  
Behind the veil of ignorance, every citizen has an equal chance of ending up in 
that worst possible socioeconomic position, and hence has an equally strong 
incentive to make that worst socioeconomic position as good as possible.26 This is 
simply the maximin rule, which in the context of distributional justice requires us 
to identify the worst possible socioeconomic position permitted by a given set of 
principles of justice, and then to select the set of principles of justice under which 
the worst possible socioeconomic position is better than the worst possible 
socioeconomic position permitted under all other sets of principles of justice.27  
Since the maximin rule is appropriate for selecting principles of justice, Rawls 
argues that society should be structured in accordance with his two principles of 
justice because they are superior to the alternatives when assessed against the 
maximin rule.28 Under Rawlsian principles, the worst-off in society retain their 
basic rights and have fair opportunities for socioeconomic advancement. 
Furthermore, any inequalities that exist are permitted under the difference 
                                                      
24 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 97-100. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 85-89. 
27 Ibid at 97-100. 
28 Ibid. 
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principle only to the extent that the worst-off benefit ultimately from them.29 
Hence, the welfare of the worst-off in society is maximised under Rawlsian 
principles of justice.  
In contrast, the principle of maximising average utility fails the maximin test 
because it permits a few citizens facing dire socioeconomic hardship and indignity 
as long as other citizens in society have a high level of welfare. The worst 
socioeconomic position permitted under the principle of maximising average 
utility is significantly worse than that permitted under Rawlsian principles. In 
conclusion, Rawls’ principles of justice guarantee the welfare of the worst-off, and 
in doing so reflect the idea that the benefits and duties of membership in society 
should be fairly distributed in a way that minimises the effect of the random 
conditions of one’s birth and upbringing on one’s welfare.  
 
C.      Nozick’s Challenge to Rawls 
 
The main rival to the Rawlsian framework overall is the alternative proposal by 
Nozick.  Nozick’s view is that social institutions, especially taxation, should be 
consistent with the Entitlement Theory. The Entitlement Theory consists of three 
principles: (1) “a person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle 
of justice in acquisition30 is entitled to that holding”; (2) “a person who acquires a 
holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else 
entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding”; and (3) “no one is entitled to a 
holding except by applications of (1) and (2).”31 Nozick thus believes that if the 
                                                      
29 Ibid at 61-66. 
30 The principle of justice in acquisition has its roots in the work of John Locke. As far as 
original acquisition is concerned, Locke argues that the removal of an object from nature, 
together with the mixing of one’s labour grants one property rights over that object. This 
argument is questionable at best when in the (relatively) primitive context in which it was 
developed. It has started to show significant strain with the passage of time and the 
development beyond the agrarian age. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, ed by Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) 
at 111-121. 
31 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1974) at 151. 
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acquisition and transfer of property is just, the resulting distribution is just. If the 
distribution of property is just, then members of society are entitled to their 
existing holdings – their property rights should be respected.  
Nozick recognises that in practice, the property rights to which individuals are 
entitled are not enforceable without a set of institutions which he calls a minimal 
state.32 Nozick defines this as a state “whose functions are limited to the ‘night-
watchman’ protection against force, theft, and fraud, the enforcement of contracts, 
and a few other essentials.”33 Nozick argues that “the minimal state treats us as 
persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes”34 because it 
guarantees the rights of individuals without itself violating those rights. A state that 
takes on roles beyond that of the minimal state, such as redistribution, is in 
Nozick’s view illegitimate because it would itself infringe individual rights.  
If true, Nozick’s view implies that Rawls’ two principles of justice are 
fundamentally in tension. Rawls’ first principle is that the state must defend basic 
individual liberties. If Nozick is correct in claiming that violating the right to 
property is always a violation of individual liberties, the state must by extension 
defend the right to property to the extent compatible with the need to fund the 
minimal state. This, however, would be inconsistent with Rawls’ second principle. 
By stipulating conditions under which socio-economic inequality would be 
justified, Rawls’ second principle justifies the state in intervening to reduce 
inequality; this, in many cases, would involve some kind of taxation on the better-
off either to directly reduce economic inequality or to fund institutions such as 
education which attempt to mitigate the side-effects of inequality. Such taxation, 
in Nozick’s view, would be tantamount to a violation of basic individual liberties 
and hence be precluded by Rawls’ first principle of justice. Hence, Nozick’s 
alternative conception of liberty and the role of the state pose a significant challenge 
to the Rawlsian principles of justice.  
                                                      
32 Nozick’s starting position seems to have been heavily influenced by ideas of The Social 
Contract, discussed in preceding classical works like Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract. All these three works in turn seem to have 
influenced Murphy and Nagel’s conception of the Myth of Ownership (see Murphy & 
Nagel, supra note 1).  
33 Nozick, supra note 31 at ix. 
34 Ibid at 333-334. 
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I disagree with Nozick’s view for two reasons. The first reason concerns the 
degree to which the pre-tax distribution of property is just. Nozick argues for the 
minimum possible level of taxation, because he assumes that the pre-tax 
distribution of property is just, and that taxation distorts this just distribution of 
property. However, it cannot be assumed that the pre-tax distribution of property 
is just as long as it is consistent with the Entitlement Theory. As Rawls argues, 
some individuals may acquire relatively more property than others as a result of 
their background or being endowed with talents. These factors are not considered 
by the Entitlement Theory, which, as Cockfield notes, is based on the idea that 
property is the reward for or earned by an individual’s choices and efforts. The 
Entitlement Theory fails to consider that property is sometimes allocated to 
individuals on a path-dependent basis for reasons that have nothing to do with 
merit or productive work.35  
Since the distribution of endowments across individuals and the social 
background in which each individual is raised are both matters of chance, no 
individuals can be said to morally deserve the benefits or property they acquire as 
a result of their background or endowments.36 Hence, the pre-tax distribution of 
property is not necessarily just. If the pre-tax distribution of property is unjust, 
then corrections must be made to the social institutions regulating the acquisition 
and transfer of property, because a distribution of property is just if and only if the 
social institutions that shape such a distribution operate in a just manner. Since 
one of these social institutions is the tax system, it is important to ensure that the 
tax system is just, which will in turn ensure a just distribution of property across 
individuals in society.  
The second reason for rejecting Nozick’s view concerns Nozick’s idea of 
taxation as infringing on individual choice. Cockfield notes that for Nozick, the 
central aspect of the right to property is the right to choose what to do with that 
property,37 and it is that latter right which Nozick seeks to protect by limiting the 
                                                      
35 Arthur Cockfield, “Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on 
Radical Consumption Tax Reform” (2001) 46 SDL Rev 8 at 58. 
36 Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 88-89. 
37 Cockfield, supra note 35 at 53, citing Nozick, supra note 31 at 171. 
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state’s role to that of the minimal state. However, it is not clear that recognising 
the right to property is consistent with the promotion of individual choice; as 
Cohen argues, state recognition of an individual’s ownership of a piece of property 
restricts the freedom of other individuals to also use that property.38  
It thus seems that Nozick’s alternative may not be particularly persuasive. We 
are left with Rawls’ principles as the most appropriate framework for ensuring that 
social institutions, including the tax and transfer system, operate in a just manner. 
There is no tension between Rawls’ first and second principles. States that enforce 
the second principle by intervening in matters of property ownership do not 
thereby violate the first principle; instead, they may reinforce it because excessive 
inequality may be injurious to the fundamental right of dignity for the worst-off 
in society.  
 
IV.      THE RAWLSIAN UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS ON THE 
REDISTRIBUTIVITY OF TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS  
 
Having successfully justified and defended the Rawls’ theory of distributive justice, 
I will now apply Rawlsian principles to the question of the redistributivity of the 
tax and transfer system. Generally speaking, taxation may have two main 
objectives: the first is to redistribute wealth from individuals who are taxed to 
individuals who receive tax-funded transfers or benefits (‘redistribution’); the 
second is to raise revenue for state expenditure on public and merit goods 
(‘revenue’). In practice these two objectives often shade into each other. States are 
by no means limited to using direct cash transfers to individuals. Instead, the most 
common form of wealth redistribution is through the provision of merit goods. 
Such provision is often targeted at maximising the benefit to those worst-off in 
society.  
The value of these two objectives is grounded on the Rawlsian principles 
governing a well-ordered society, since taxation is a social institution that must 
hence operate in a manner consistent with these principles. Having already 
                                                      
38 Gerald A Cohen, “Freedom and Money” in Michael Otsuka, ed, On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011) at 181-186. 
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explored what the Rawlsian principles imply about the proper objectives of a tax 
and transfer system, I will now discuss the extent to which tax and transfer systems 
must be redistributive if they are to achieve these proper objectives.  
It is important at this point to consider Sugin’s insight, building on the work 
of Murphy and Nagel, that the tax and transfer system is just one, albeit important, 
piece in the web of institutions and policies that guarantee distributive justice.39 
The upshot is that Rawlsian principles alone cannot be decisive when societies 
consider the precise details of tax and transfer schemes. This is not just because 
different societies have different objectives and priorities or because policy 
implementation depends on considerations of economic and political feasibility. 
More pertinently, other rules and policies can affect and alter the ultimate impact 
of a tax and transfer scheme on distributive justice,40 such that principles of 
distributive justice cannot be applied to decide the details of tax and transfer 
schemes in isolation from other considerations.  
This is not to say that Rawlsian principles cannot guide the formulation of tax 
and transfer schemes except when such schemes are considered in conjunction with 
the entirety of state policy. Instead, Rawlsian principles can tell us more about the 
nature of the distributive justice that tax and transfer schemes are designed to 
promote, and, crucially, what kinds of tax and transfer policies do not promote 
distributive justice.41 For example, an endowment tax would be precluded by 
Rawls’ first principle of justice, because it would violate individual liberty by 
“[forcing] the more able into those occupations in which earnings [are] high 
enough for them to pay off the tax in the required period of time.”42 In that light, 
                                                      
39 Linda Sugin, “Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls 
Demands from Tax Systems” (2003-2004) 72 Fordham L Rev 1991 at 1992. 
40 Ibid at 1993. As discussed earlier, economic and political factors may challenge the 
boundaries of redistributive taxation. It is an open question whether temporary suspension 
of Rawlsian principles to achieve a much better economic outcome in the long run is 
permissible. This is a very real problem that still frequently arises, particularly in developing 
countries (see Dilnot, supra note 2). This is complicated by issues with Rawls’ position on 
intergenerational justice, which I am inclined to argue, has not been reasoned in a totally 
convincing manner. See Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 253-254; Meyer, 
supra note 12; Wall, supra note 12; and Payden, supra note 12.  
41 Sugin, supra note 39 at 1993. 
42 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 158. 
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what we are concerned with in this article is not the broad question of how tax and 
transfer policy depends on Rawlsian considerations, but the narrower question of 
what Rawlsian principles imply about the maximum and minimum extent to 
which tax and transfer systems should be redistributive. Hence, in the following 
sections, I will discuss the upper and lower bounds that Rawlsian principles impose 
on the redistributivity of tax and transfer systems.  
 
A.      The Rawlsian Lower Bound on Redistributivity: Taxation for the Purpose of 
Redistribution 
 
The first objective of taxation is to raise revenue for state expenditure on direct 
transfers and benefits in kind to specific individuals. This expenditure has a 
distributive effect if there are individuals who pay more in tax than they receive in 
transfers and benefits and also distinct individuals who receive more in transfers 
and benefits than they pay in tax. The justification for this type of expenditure is 
that through this, the tax and transfer system overall helps the state achieve a 
desirable distribution of wealth in society. The Rawlsian principles for a well-
ordered society determine what wealth distributions are desirable, and the target 
wealth distribution in turn determines how redistributive the tax and transfer 
system must be overall.  
It might be argued that taxation is illegitimate if it aims to achieve a socially 
desirable distribution of wealth. It will not come as a surprise that the most 
prominent opponent of redistributive taxation has been Nozick. He has developed 
the concept that “liberty upsets patterns”, using the Wilt Chamberlain example to 
argue that it would be illegitimate to engage in the redistribution of wealth on the 
grounds of social justice.43 To do so would be to infringe upon the property rights 
of people to dispose of their property as they wish.44 Having made the decision to 
transfer their wealth, the government should not interfere to counteract the 
consequences of such a decision. Nozick builds upon the Aristotelian concepts of 
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corrective and distributive justice,45 arguing that redistribution of wealth cannot 
be justified on the grounds of distributive justice, but may, in some cases, be 
justified by concerns of corrective justice.46 
The weakness of Nozick’s argument has already been considered earlier. 
Everything hinges on his Entitlement Theory, which has already been shown to be 
rather shaky.47 As Cockfield notes, Nozick’s argument fails to consider that 
property may not always be allocated to individuals due to their own merit.48 Rawls 
too has consistently argued against the idea of individuals morally deserving their 
property.49 
Nozick supports the Kantian principle that humans should not be treated 
merely as a means to an end,50 and argues that redistribution treats net contributors 
as a mere resource to support net recipients. Nozick opposes this on the ground 
that it fails to recognise the “separateness of persons”.51 In order for the principle 
of the separateness of persons to be relevant to the issue of redistribution, an 
essential connection between an individual and that individual’s property must be 
recognised. This argument, however, can be contested on three grounds. Firstly, 
individuals owe duties to each other by entering into a system of reciprocity and 
cooperation that is society, and one of these is the duty to uphold each individual’s 
status as a free and equal citizen. A just distribution of wealth is the only 
distribution under which individuals can be free and equal, and promoting such a 
distribution is hence one of the duties of individuals.52 Secondly, the accumulation 
                                                      
45 See John Gardner, The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law (2000) CLP at 1-30; 
and Ernest Weinrib, “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 UTLJ 349 at 349-356. 
Weinrib explains Aristotle’s framework, noting that corrective justice focuses on whether 
one party has committed and the other has suffered a transactional injustice, while 
distributive justice deals with the distribution of whatever is divisible among the 
participants in a political community (see Weinrib, supra note 45 at 349). 
46 Nozick, supra note 31 at 160-164. 
47 See, supra note 30. 
48 Cockfield, supra note 35 at 58. 
49 Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 88-89. 
50 Nozick, supra note 31 at 30-31. 
51 Ibid at 169. 
52 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 5. 
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of property by net contributors is made possible only by social institutions, and 
hence society is justified in reallocating property to achieve socially desirable 
outcomes.53 
Finally, state-enforced redistribution of property threatens only the separateness 
of property holdings but not that of individuals. The separateness of individuals is 
not threatened because individuals retain the right, even under a redistributive tax 
and transfer system, to determine whether or not to respond to the socioeconomic 
incentives for them to develop and exercise their talents. Instead of forcing 
individuals to sacrifice their interests for those of others, a redistributive tax and 
transfer system promotes reciprocity because those who benefit as a direct result of 
socially-instituted inequalities are asked in turn to contribute to the welfare of 
others and to society as a whole. Hence, ensuring a desirable distribution of wealth 
in society is a legitimate and important goal of taxation.  
Four arguments from Rawlsian principles imply that such a desirable 
distribution of wealth in society can often only be achieved through a redistributive 
tax and transfer system. 
 
1. The hardship argument 
 
The first argument concerns the preventable extreme hardship faced by the worst-
off.54 The argument suggests that wealth should be redistributed to the worst-off 
from other members of society, in order to prevent the worst-off from facing 
extreme hardship or a violation of their fundamental liberties caused by material 
impoverishment. It seems intuitive that “unless there is real scarcity, all should have 
at least enough to meet their basic needs.”55 It is difficult to see, however, why 
societies are obligated to guarantee a minimum material standard of living for their 
worst-off. Indeed, Freeman draws a distinction between the “individual moral duty 
                                                      
53 See Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1; Hobbes, supra note 1; and Rousseau, supra note 1.  
54 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 130. 
55 Ibid. 
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of charity” and “the idea that the members of society collectively … have a political 
duty to support the poor.”56  
However, I suggest that a Rawlsian society conceived as a “fair system of social 
cooperation”57 would owe a duty to prevent its worst-off from facing extreme 
hardship insofar as they perform duties of social cooperation, such as being bound 
by the laws of the state and responding to summons for jury duty. Furthermore, 
Rawls’ first and lexically most fundamental principle of justice would require a 
redistribution of wealth to prevent extreme hardship caused by the material 
deprivation of the worst-off. This first argument is what I will call the ‘Hardship 
Argument’.  
 
2. The indignity argument 
 
The second argument, also advanced by Rawls,58 is that excessive inequality 
threatens the dignity of the worst-off, even if it does not directly cause extreme 
material hardship. Rawls argues that “significant political and economic 
inequalities are often associated with inequalities of social status that encourage 
those of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and by others as inferior.”59 
Rawls considers these effects to be serious evils and the attitudes they engender to 
be great vices.60 These effects may be serious enough to constitute a breach of 
Rawls’ first principle of justice if one considers the right to human dignity as a 
fundamental liberty and if inequality is so severe as to systematically engender 
feelings of inferiority that violate this right.  
Rawls adds that “fixed status ascribed by birth, or by gender or race, is 
particularly odious,”61 showing that the cause of inequality may compound its 
effect on the indignity suffered by the worst-off. This argument, which I will call 
                                                      
56 Ibid. 
56 Freeman, supra note 13 at 86. 
57 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4. 
58 Ibid at 131. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 131. 
61 Ibid. 
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the ‘Indignity Argument’, concludes that redistribution should be used to avoid 
the indignity associated with excessive inequality. Insofar as the argument is valid, 
it relies on Rawls’ framework – specifically, the first principle of justice.  
 
3. The equal opportunity argument 
 
The third argument is unmistakably Rawlsian and concerns the propensity for 
excessive inequality to undermine FEO; I will call it the ‘Equal Opportunity 
Argument’. Rawls argues that institutions such as universal education that 
guarantee FEO “are put in jeopardy when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain 
limit.”62 As Bird-Pollan argues, it should be noted that inequality only threatens 
FEO when it becomes excessive, as some inequality in the distribution of assets 
may not result in unequal opportunity for citizens.63 However, in cases where 
inequality is excessive, redistribution is necessary to protect FEO. Separately, a 
redistributive tax and transfer system may be necessary to fund the institutions that 
guarantee FEO by providing equal opportunities to all (refer to the Sufficient 
Revenue Argument below). Hence, the condition of FEO that is part of Rawls’ 
framework also underpins this argument.  
 
4. The reciprocity argument 
 
The fourth argument arises from the difference principle or the second condition 
of Rawls’ second principle of justice, which states that socioeconomic inequalities 
are permissible only if they are to the benefit of the least advantaged.64 These 
inequalities have two effects on the worst-off. Their indirect trickle-down effect 
makes society as a whole, including the worst-off, better off by incentivising 
talented individuals to contribute to increasing the social product. However, their 
direct allocative effect benefits the better-off at the expense of the worse-off, as the 
worst-off will enjoy a smaller share of the aggregate social product if social 
inequality is high. Hence, these two effects have opposing implications for the 
                                                      
62 Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, supra note 8 at 246. 
63 Bird-Pollan, supra note 9 at 724. 
64 Ibid at 42-43. 
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welfare of the worst-off: the indirect effect makes them better off, while the direct 
effect makes them worse off. If the magnitude of the direct effect is sufficiently 
large relative to that of the indirect effect, the difference principle may be violated, 
as the overall effect of these inequalities will not be beneficial to the worst-off.  
In these cases, the state might be justified, based on the difference principle, in 
imposing a tax on the incomes of the better-off that funds transfers to the worst-
off. Such a tax would uphold the difference principle in this way: if inequality 
results in the better-off receiving larger incomes than they otherwise would, the 
worst-off also benefit indirectly by receiving part of the income of the better-off via 
the tax and transfer system. By carefully adjusting tax policy, states can ensure that 
the tax and transfer system acts in conjunction with the indirect trickle-down effect 
to counteract the direct allocative effect, guaranteeing that socioeconomic 
inequalities benefit the worst-off overall. In this way, the difference principle can 
be fulfilled and a desirable distribution of wealth achieved. I note that the difference 
principle essentially expresses the notion of reciprocity: the better-off benefit from 
socioeconomic inequalities, but are made to reciprocate via social institutions that 
ensure that even the worst-off also benefit from the existence of these inequalities. 
Hence, I will refer to this argument as the ‘Reciprocity Argument’, as it is 
underpinned by the difference principle.  
In short, the Rawlsian principles for a well-ordered society lead us to several 
strong arguments in favour of a redistributive tax and transfer system, on the basis 
that such redistributivity is needed to accomplish an important goal of any tax and 
transfer system – to ensure a desirable distribution of wealth in society.  
 
B.      The Rawlsian Lower Bound on Redistributivity: Taxation to Support 
Expenditure on Public and Merit Goods 
 
The second objective of taxation is to raise revenue to fund state expenditure on 
public and merit goods or, more generally, goods that promote the collective and 
social good. The justification for this type of expenditure derives from the fact that 
these goods have benefits that are non-excludable; given this, they will be 
undersupplied unless society can coordinate to produce the socially optimal 
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amount of these goods.65 This coordination is often best achieved through the 
institutions of the state, especially taxation, which effectively serves to coordinate 
collective spending on these goods by individuals in society.  
It might seem that there are no Rawlsian grounds on which the state can engage 
in further taxation once the Rawlsian conditions for a just distribution of 
socioeconomic resources are met, because such a distribution would already be just 
in Rawlsian terms. However, Rawls conceives of a society as a fair system of 
cooperation where free and equal citizens collectively act in their common interest 
through means such as jointly funding public goods. Furthermore, he believes that 
a just society should seek ways to increase the collective social product. Hence, a 
society organised on Rawlsian principles must commit to at least some level of 
spending on public and merit goods. Indeed, Rawls argues that “if a sufficiently 
large number of [citizens] find the marginal benefits of public goods greater than 
that of goods available through the market, it is appropriate that ways should be 
found for government to provide them.”66 This leaves us with two questions: first, 
the question of what public and merit goods the state should fund; second, the 
question of how the state should distribute the burden of funding such expenditure 
across individuals in society.  
I will now address the first question of what public and merit goods should be 
funded by the state. It might seem that the state should only fund public or merit 
goods if each of the individuals that are compelled via taxation to contribute to the 
funding of these goods would have willingly contributed to funding these goods 
even without being taxed. This principle would be justified by the Nozickian 
principle that individuals are entitled to their property and should decide for 
themselves how to utilise that property; hence, it would be legitimate for 
individuals to freely choose to pool resources and supply a common good, but 
illegitimate for the state to enforce such pooling of resources by imposing coercive 
tax burdens on unwilling individuals.  
Based on such a test, national defence is a good that should be funded via 
taxation, as individuals would in general be willing to pool resources to provide for 
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a good like defence from which all in society benefit. However, such a test would 
preclude the state from raising taxes to fund a bridge that serves only a particular 
area, or to fund a subsidy programme targeted at only a certain industry. Like 
national defence, these goods benefit society collectively, but the difference is that 
this benefit is unevenly distributed across citizens. Even though the social benefits 
may outweigh the social cost of these goods, they only benefit a subset of the 
population and it is unlikely that individuals that do not benefit from such 
programmes would be willing to pay the taxes necessary to fund them. This implies 
that these goods fail the test, as they would be funded by imposing coercive tax 
burdens on unwilling individuals who do not benefit. Since this test precludes the 
state from funding goods that do not benefit every citizen in society despite having 
a net social benefit, I believe it is a poor test to determine which public or merit 
goods should be state-funded.  
Instead, I argue that goods with a net social benefit should be funded so long 
as they optimise the social product. These goods form an optimal set of goods and 
should be funded even if the individual goods that are included in this optimal set 
do not each and by themselves benefit every member of society. If coupled with an 
appropriate tax and transfer system that distributes the benefits of this optimal set 
across individuals according to Rawlsian principles, this optimal set could benefit 
every member of society, such that all citizens would be willing to fund this set and 
no coercive tax burdens need to be imposed.  
I note that since not every good in the optimal set benefits every citizen, some 
citizens will be making sacrifices for the common good in the sense that the taxes 
they pay are funding goods that do not benefit them directly but instead increase 
the social product. These sacrifices, however, are consistent with the Rawlsian 
conception of a society as a system of cooperation where the sacrifices of individuals 
for the common good are reciprocated by similar sacrifices made by other 
individuals, such that society as a whole collectively increases its common product 
in a way that ensures each individual is better-off by being a member of society.  
We now turn to the second question of how the state should distribute the 
burden of funding expenditure on public and merit goods across individuals in 
society. I argue that redistributive taxation for the purpose of funding public and 
merit goods would be legitimate. The better-off would benefit from the 
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socioeconomic inequalities created by social institutions, but reciprocate by 
funding public and merit goods that benefit society at large. Indeed, I will present 
two positive arguments from Rawlsian principles to support the claim that the 
better-off should contribute relatively more towards state expenditure on public 
and merit goods. 
 
1. The equal sacrifice argument 
 
The first argument, which I will call the ‘Equal Sacrifice Argument’, is advanced 
by Murphy and Nagel67 and uses a concept borrowed from economics. It relies on 
the idea of diminishing marginal utility, which in this situation, refers to the 
decrease in the marginal utility derived from having each additional unit of income 
or wealth. Since the marginal utility derived from having additional income or 
wealth diminishes as income or wealth increases, a person who is worse-off may 
sacrifice more utility than a person who is better-off if both are taxed at the same 
rate. Progressive taxation remedies this; by imposing a higher tax rate on the better-
off, it ensures that the better-off and the worse-off make equal sacrifices in terms 
of utility. The desirability of equal sacrifice is grounded on the Rawlsian notion 
that society is a fair system of cooperation. Such cooperation is only fair if every 
member of society reciprocally makes equal contributions and sacrifices towards 
the common good.  
 
2. The sufficient revenue argument 
 
The second argument concerns the manner in which governments raise revenue. 
Governments have significant spending obligations, as large amounts are spent on 
socially-beneficial public and merit goods. However, if the government raises the 
funds for this expenditure via a non-redistributive tax and transfer system, it runs 
the risk of widening inequality in society as the worst-off will bear a greater burden 
of income relative to their material assets. Such increased inequality would, on a 
                                                      
67 Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1 at 23. 
34 Sing L Rev REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 197 
 
 
Rawlsian view, be undesirable for reasons such as hardship and equality of 
opportunity, as explained above.  
To avoid violating Rawlsian principles of justice by worsening inequality, the 
state has two choices: it can either reduce expenditure so as to alleviate the tax 
burden on the worst-off, or it can adopt a redistributive tax and transfer system 
that raises sufficient revenue for the state without worsening inequality. The first 
alternative of reducing expenditure should largely be rejected by states: not only 
should they be prepared to fund expenditure on public or merit goods that improve 
the overall social product, but more importantly, as Sugin argues, they should also 
allocate sufficient resources to maintain public institutions that mitigate the 
undesirable effects of inequality, such as education and economic regulation.68 
This, of course, depends on the various economic and political factors at play in 
the short term. In the long run, however, it is generally accepted that expenditure 
on public and merit goods is beneficial for the country. States should instead 
choose the second option of raising sufficient revenue through taxation while 
ensuring, through redistributivity, that such taxation does not impose undue 
burdens on the worst-off. Hence, I will call this argument the ‘Sufficient Revenue 
argument’.  
Evidently, the Equal Sacrifice and Sufficient Revenue arguments both presume 
the legitimacy of government decisions to spend on the public or merit goods. 
Indeed, Murphy and Nagel object to the Equal Sacrifice argument on the grounds 
that “it treats the justice of tax burdens as if it could be separated from the justice 
of the pattern of government expenditure.”69 The upshot is that these two 
arguments are not sufficient to support the imposition of a redistributive tax and 
transfer system. However, if state expenditure on public and merit goods can be 
justified, these arguments both constitute strong reasons for states to fund such 
expenditure in a redistributive manner.  
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C.      The Rawlsian Upper Bound on Redistributivity: Incentives and  
Property Rights 
 
Only a tax and transfer system that is to some extent redistributive can meet the 
proper objectives of the social institution of taxation as prescribed by the Rawlsian 
framework. However, the same Rawlsian framework also prescribes limits on the 
extent to which a tax and transfer system can be redistributive.  
The first limit arises from the fact that the differences in native endowments, 
or potential assets we possess from birth that are only realised through training and 
effort, across individuals in society are to be regarded as a ‘common asset’ to be 
exploited for the social good.70 Based on the Rawlsian framework, socioeconomic 
inequalities help society make the most of this common resource in two ways: 
firstly, these inequalities compensate talented individuals for the effort and 
education required to hone their talents; secondly, these inequalities create 
incentives for talented individuals to utilise their potential and endowments to 
benefit society in general.71  
An overly redistributive tax and transfer system, however, would reduce these 
socioeconomic inequalities to the extent that these inequalities could neither 
compensate talented individuals for their effort nor incentivise them to contribute 
to society. Such a tax and transfer system would undermine the purpose of society 
as a fair system of mutually-beneficial cooperation, as some level of socioeconomic 
inequality is needed to fully realise the benefits of social cooperation and the 
common resource that is the distribution of endowments across individuals.  
The second limit arises from the existence of individual property rights. In 
theory, the social product could be greatly increased if the better-off were taxed at 
very high rates to fund expenditure on a large number of socially-beneficial public 
and merit goods. Such a tax and transfer system would be consistent with the two 
conditions of Rawls’ second principle of justice. However, it would constitute a 
breach of Rawls’ first principle of basic liberties.  
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Rawls considers the right to exclusive use of property a basic liberty because the 
possession of and control over a minimum amount of property is one condition 
for free exercise of one’s moral powers, which in turn is the basis for one’s self-
respect.72 Individuals may face no legal restrictions on making a certain choice, but 
will not be able to realise or exercise that choice without the necessary material 
resources or property. Hence, dictating the way in which individuals should utilise 
their property holdings or imposing excessive levels of taxation on them constitutes 
a breach of their basic liberty. A highly redistributive tax and transfer system that 
imposes excessive rates of taxation on the better-off would thus be incompatible 
with Rawls’ first principle of a well-ordered society.  
 
V.      APPLICATION TO MODERN SOCIETIES 
 
In this section, I will apply the theoretical conclusions about the limits imposed by 
Rawls’ framework of a well-ordered society on the redistributivity of tax and 
transfer systems. Specifically, I will examine if these limits remain relevant given 
three features of modern societies: (1) the status of the worst-off as well-off in 
material terms; (2) the unclear status of immigrants within a society constituted by 
free and equal citizens; and (3) the increasing contribution of corporations to state 
revenue.  
 
A.      Material Well-being of the Worst-off 
 
I will first discuss what the Rawlsian framework would imply for a society where 
the worst-off are well-off in absolute terms (in other words, a society where absolute 
poverty and hardship does not exist but relative inequality remains). This issue is 
particularly pertinent in the modern context because the worst-off are becoming 
significantly better-off in material terms. Since the time of Rawls, the number of 
people living below the global poverty line has diminished significantly. At the 
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same time, global inequality has remained fairly steady over the same time period.73 
In short, many societies today can be characterised as societies with little absolute 
poverty but significant inequality in relative terms.  
The only Rawlsian argument for redistribution that is premised on the absolute 
poverty of the worst-off is the Hardship Argument. If the worst-off in a given 
society do not face extreme material hardship, then the need to prevent such 
hardship is inapplicable as an argument for redistributive taxation in that society. 
However, the Indignity and Equal Opportunity Arguments will apply regardless 
of the absolute status of the worst-off. These arguments are concerned with the 
pernicious effects of excess inequality, which occur regardless of the absolute well-
being of the worst-off. However, in societies where inequality in relative terms is 
low, the Indignity and Equal Opportunity arguments do not apply because the 
harmful effects on which they are premised only occur in situations of excess 
inequality.  
Even in societies where inequality is low and not excessive, there remains a case 
for a redistributive tax and transfer system based on the Reciprocity, Equal Sacrifice 
and Sufficient Revenue arguments. Regardless of the status of the worst-off, the 
better-off have a duty to contribute to the worst-off as a result of benefiting from 
socioeconomic inequalities. They also have a duty to make equal sacrifices or 
otherwise contribute what is needed to finance common goods. These are in-
principle duties that must be fulfilled by the better-off in a well-ordered society, no 
matter what their consequences are. In contrast, the Hardship, Indignity, and 
Equal Opportunity Arguments concern the specific and contingent effects of 
redistribution, and hence they constitute good arguments for redistribution only 
in societies where the effects are relevant. Hence the Reciprocity, Equal Sacrifice 
and Sufficient Revenue arguments are relevant across all societies. 
Similarly, the constraints on the appropriate level of redistributivity for a 
Rawlsian society will not be affected by the absolute or relative status of the worst-
off. There will always be a strong need for incentives to encourage talented 
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individuals to develop their endowments, and there should always be respect for 
individual property rights.  
To conclude this section, most arguments for and against redistribution will 
remain relevant regardless of the absolute status of the worst-off, and some of those 
will also remain relevant even when levels of inequality are low. The key exception 
is the Hardship Argument – it seeks to prevent extreme hardship, and naturally 
becomes inapplicable when the worst-off do not face such hardship.  
 
B.      Immigrants 
 
I will now discuss the interconnected trends of globalisation, labour mobility, and 
immigration. The collective effect of these trends is to blur the lines between 
individuals who are members of a given society and those who are not. A person 
may be a citizen of one society but may choose to migrate or work in another 
society. I will first consider the case of citizen emigrants from a society and then 
the case of non-citizen immigrants in a society. In both cases, we are concerned 
with how the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds for the redistributivity of a tax and 
transfer system might be modified to accommodate the unique features of these 
cases.  
 
1. Citizen emigrants 
 
For citizen emigrants,74 the pertinent issue is that of taxation on overseas income:75 
should the income obtained by an individual from their overseas activities be 
                                                      
74 While not all citizens who generate income from overseas activities are emigrants, 
emigrants would conduct most of their economic activities abroad and so the conclusions 
of this section are particularly applicable to them. Nevertheless, these conclusions can be 
generalised to citizens who are not emigrants but nevertheless generate part or all of the 
income from overseas activities.  
75 Many jurisdictions have adopted the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] tax treaty template and implemented Double Tax Agreements 
[DTAs]. While many of the arguments for DTAs are economic in nature (e.g. promoting 
free trade), there seems to be a strong moral feeling that there is a weaker basis for taxing 
citizens who are non-residents. 
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subject to taxes imposed by the society of which the individual is a citizen, 
especially if that overseas income is already subject to taxation in the overseas 
jurisdiction where the income-generating activities took place?76 This question has 
implications for the redistributivity of a tax and transfer system: if income 
generated from a citizen’s overseas activities is treated as non-taxable, then wealthy 
citizens that derive most of their income from overseas activities could pay less in 
taxes than citizens who are less wealthy but do not have overseas income, hence 
reducing the redistributivity of the system overall. Indeed, if in principle overseas-
generated income should not be subject to double taxation or any taxation at all, 
then the non-taxability of overseas income might constitute another part of the 
upper bound on the degree to which a tax and transfer system should be 
redistributive.  
I suggest that the answer to the question is yes – income generated overseas 
should still be subject to taxation, for two reasons. Firstly, citizens that have 
emigrated nevertheless retain all the rights that they would enjoy in the home 
society. They retain their full rights to political participation, they could benefit 
from the institutions that guarantee FEO should they decide to engage in economic 
activity within the home society, and they would benefit from the redistributive 
effects of the difference principle if their economic circumstances change for the 
worse. As society is a reciprocal system of social cooperation, responsibilities such 
as taxation are a corollary of these rights.  
Secondly, by continuing to be citizens of the home society, these emigrants 
continue to interact with other citizens of the home society and hence owe duties 
to these other citizens. However, citizens that accumulate excessive wealth from 
their overseas activities might undermine FEO and violate the dignity of the worst-
off within the home society, and this would breach the responsibilities of these 
citizens towards the other citizens in the home society. To avoid this and to fulfil 
their responsibilities, these citizens would have to be subject to taxation on their 
overseas income. In short, wealth generated overseas may have similar effects to 
                                                      
76 The United States’ tax policy on non-resident citizens on worldwide income currently 
has the widest potential scope of application in the world and arguably comes close to 
testing the moral limits of taxation.  
34 Sing L Rev REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 203 
 
 
wealth generated domestically in terms of increasing inequality and in terms of the 
pernicious effects of such inequality.  
One might argue, contrary to these two arguments, that the home society plays 
no role in creating the conditions or environment in which its citizens earn their 
overseas income; since citizens who have earned income from overseas activities did 
not directly benefit from the institutions of the state, they should be exempt from 
contributing to the funding of these institutions. By that flawed logic, however, it 
would be the worst-off that should pay the most tax, because under Rawlsian 
principles they should receive the most direct benefits from society’s institutions. 
Yet, it is clear that societies are fully justified not only in levying more taxes on the 
better-off, but also in levying taxes on those who benefit materially from their 
natural endowments, even though society had no part to play in the individual’s 
possession of these endowments. From this, we can infer that taxation is not an 
economic transaction where citizens contribute as much to the system as they 
receive.77  
Instead, taxation is imposed on the basis of one’s membership of a society, and 
not necessarily on the basis that one has, in actuality, benefited from the 
institutions of society. Membership of a society comes with rights and 
responsibilities, and the responsibilities that citizens must bear, such as the 
responsibility to pay tax, are not reduced even if their corresponding rights would 
be guaranteed in the absence of society. For instance, citizens who can afford to 
hire their own private security force are not relieved of the duty to contribute 
towards public security, even though their right to safety does not directly depend 
on the protection of society. This is because they retain their right to be protected 
by society in the event that they ever give up their private security force. Crucially, 
by remaining members of society, they retain the same rights and responsibilities 
as every other citizen, including the right to security and the responsibility to 
                                                      
77 Conceptually, this brings us to the familiar debate between Benefit Theory and the 
Ability to Pay Principle. Benefit Theory has largely fallen out of fashion because it tends to 
lead to the absurd conclusion that those worst-off in society should be paying the most tax 
because they are the most likely to be given financial support by the Government. It thus 
seems that it is well justified to use the Ability to Pay principle in this context. See Tiley 
and Loutzenhiser, supra note 2 at para 1.3.1. Also see Murphy and Nagel, supra note 1 at 
16-31. 
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contribute to public security, and the fact that they have voluntarily chosen not to 
exercise or directly benefit from their rights does not affect their responsibilities.  
Analogously, while it is true that emigrants do not benefit directly from the 
socioeconomic conditions and institutions of the home society, citizen emigrants 
retain the right to return to their home society and benefit from these 
socioeconomic conditions and institutions should they wish to do so. Citizens that 
decide to permanently forego this right can sever their ties to the home society by 
renouncing their citizenship, and in that case their responsibilities to the home 
society, including the duty to pay tax on overseas-generated income would also 
lapse. By deciding not to forego this right, however, emigrants that retain their 
citizenship also retain the responsibility to pay tax on all their income, including 
that portion of their income which is generated from overseas activities.  
Having established that there are good Rawlsian grounds on which overseas 
income is taxable, we will briefly consider the justifiability of imposing a “brain 
drain tax”. Such a tax would be levied on citizens who emigrate and hence do not 
contribute as much as they could otherwise have to the common product of their 
home society, despite having benefited from education and other opportunities 
previously granted by the home society. My position is that such a tax cannot be 
imposed for the purpose of punishing those that do not contribute, despite being 
capable, to the social product. This is because as Rawls argues, the decision of 
whether or not to engage in economic activities is a matter of individual choice78 – 
a choice protected under the first of his principles of justice.  
However, societies are fully justified in offering incentives to citizens for 
contributing to the domestic social product as opposed to engaging in overseas 
economic activities; such incentives are consistent with the practice of permitting 
                                                      
78 Rawls argues, in the case of the better-endowed, that they should not be penalised for 
choosing not to contribute to the social product and for deciding to focus on other pursuits 
instead, as this would violate their liberty. See Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 
157-158). While Rawls may hold this opinion, there have certainly been proposals to tax 
people on the maximum potential income which they could earn and not their actual 
income (see Murphy and Nagel, supra note 1 at 20-23). The traditional reason for not 
proceeding with this proposal is the sheer administrative impossibility in calculating the tax 
payable under such a scheme. Ultimately, it is submitted that this crosses a boundary 
legitimately set by a Rawlsian principle and individually should not be taxed on this basis.  
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socioeconomic inequalities as incentives for citizens to develop and utilise their 
talents. In this case, the incentive could take the form of lower income tax rates on 
domestically-generated income relative to overseas income. While this incentive 
would resemble a brain drain tax from the perspective of the taxpayer, it is crucial 
to bear in mind the distinction between a tax imposed to penalise an emigrant’s 
failure to contribute to the domestic social product which is payable regardless of 
the income generated by the emigrant’s overseas activities, and a tax imposed only 
on the emigrant’s overseas income to incentivise that citizen to shift some economic 
activities back home.  
Hence, there are good grounds both for imposing taxation on citizens’ overseas 
income, and for imposing such taxation in a manner that is consistent with the 
Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity of tax and transfer 
systems. Societies would be equally well-justified in imposing higher taxes on 
overseas income in order to encourage citizens to contribute to the domestic social 
product. Practically, however, double taxation in this manner may prove to be a 
rather difficult task due to the difficulty of enforcement, and I note that various 
systems have been designed to enhance the ability of tax authorities worldwide to 
obtain information on the international activities of their citizens.79 Regardless of 
the success of such efforts, my argument here is that societies are fully justified in 
principle in taxing overseas income; any hesitation on the part of states should 
hence arise from practical and not moral considerations.  
 
2. Non-citizen immigrants 
 
Having discussed citizen emigrants, I will now consider the case of non-citizen 
immigrants. I will neither discuss immigrant citizens nor citizens who were 
previously citizens of a foreign society as these citizens would have the same rights 
and responsibilities as that of any other citizen. Returning to non-citizen 
                                                      
79 Stephen Phua refers to this as a “data gap” and highlights the various measures 
implemented to remedy it. (See Stephen Phua, “Convergence in Global Tax Compliance” 
(2015) SJLS 77 at 81-97). Recent developments by the OECD on the Base Erosion and 
Profits Shifting [BEPS] project and the Common Reporting Standard [CRS] have made 
enormous progress and have potential to reduce the data gap significantly.  
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immigrants, I note that they do not fit neatly within Rawls’ original conception of 
a well-ordered society constituted by free and equal citizens. As many immigrants 
are not citizens, they would not be considered members of society within Rawls’ 
framework.  
Nevertheless, these non-citizen immigrants make significant contributions to 
society and engage in various forms of socioeconomic cooperation with citizens, 
especially if they reside in society for an extended period of time. Hence, while they 
are not citizens, immigrants are part of the system of social cooperation that 
constitutes society and also permanently fall under the jurisdiction of the state that 
governs society. Given that their place in Rawls’ framework is unclear, the structure 
of the taxes that should be imposed on them is also unclear. Hence, in this section, 
I will be exploring the extent to which the tax and transfer system for non-citizen 
immigrants should be redistributive. 
I will begin by examining what the basis of membership in a society is, which 
in turn grounds the rights and responsibilities that citizens possess in relation to 
society and from this we can determine the extent to which this basis applies to 
non-citizen immigrants. I will discuss two relevant models here. On the first model 
(drawn from Dworkin80), citizens become members of society and acquire their 
rights and responsibilities by association, in other words, by engaging, exchanging, 
and interacting with other citizens and society at large.  
Based on this associative model, citizens need not consent directly to being 
members of society, but indirectly become members of society if they interact and 
associate with society and its citizens to a sufficiently large extent.81 As Dworkin 
argues: “Political association, like family and friendship and other forms of 
association more local and intimate, is in itself pregnant of obligation.”82 It is no 
                                                      
80 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 
195-202, 206-207. 
81 Dworkin’s association theory has been criticised by Leslie Green, who argues that 
“[p]eople in organic associations do often feel obligations to other members, but we 
normally seek an independent ground to justify them,” see Leslie Green, “Legal Obligation 
and Authority” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed by Edward N Zalta (2003), 
online: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/> at 4.1. 
82 Dworkin, supra note 80 at 206-207. 
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objection to that claim that “most people do not choose their political communities 
but are born into them or brought there in childhood.”83  
In contrast, the second and alternative model suggests that citizens become 
members of society on the basis of a social contract.84 Based on this contractarian 
model, the rights and responsibilities of individual citizens are stipulated by some 
version of the social contract, to which individuals either explicitly consent or 
implicitly consent by continuing to accept the jurisdiction of the state that 
implements the terms of the social contract.  
I do not believe that the contractarian approach is useful for understanding the 
status of citizens. Citizens cannot be interpreted as having explicitly agreed to any 
sort of social contract; instead, they are most often unconditionally awarded 
citizenship upon birth, well before they acquire an independent capacity to make 
free choices. Nor can it be argued that citizens implicitly agree to the social contract 
by virtue of continuing to accept the jurisdiction of a state. It can only be said that 
citizens implicitly consent in this way if they have a genuinely free choice to leave 
the jurisdiction of the state and become members of another society. In practice, 
however, most citizens lack any ability to uproot themselves in this abrupt manner. 
In contrast, the associative model seems better able to account for the fact that 
citizenship is not acquired by choice but is maintained through extended 
participation in and association with society. Individuals, while possessing the 
formal status of citizenship, often consider themselves members of society only 
because they engage regularly in it. The associative model is also consistent with 
the Rawlsian conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation,85 where 
individuals interact and cooperate with each other in a reciprocal manner that 
constitutes society.  
Given that the status of citizens can be understood based on the associative 
model, we turn now to the question of how best to understand the status of 
                                                      
83 Ibid. 
84 The contractarian model has been extensively discussed and developed since its first 
(modern) formulation by Thomas Hobbes. See D’Agostino, Fred, Gaus, Gerald and 
Thrasher, John, “Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed by Edward N Zalta (2011), online: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/> at 1.1-1.3. 
85 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4. 
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immigrants. The contractarian model seems to be relevant to immigrants, because 
they, unlike citizens, consciously and explicitly choose to become members of a 
given society through the process of voluntary migration. Over time, as the 
immigrants engage in prolonged interaction and association with society, the basis 
of their links with society gradually shifts away from the contractarian model and 
towards the associative model. This is dependent on the facts of each individual 
and is a matter of degree. Hence, I believe that the best model to understand 
immigrants must be a hybrid of the associative and contractarian models. In the 
case of long-term non-citizen residents (‘permanent residents’), these immigrants 
make a conscious decision to deepen their links with the society, through a process 
that is both associative and contractual in nature. Such immigrants can be said to 
have their social obligations derived from both models in equal proportion.  
Thus far, I have shown that citizens and immigrants are different in one 
important respect: the basis of their social obligations. Citizens and non-citizen 
residents also differ in a second crucial aspect: non-citizen immigrants remain a 
citizen of their home society, and retain the ability to exercise all the rights they 
could enjoy in that society; citizens, on the other hand, possess rights and 
responsibilities in relation to only a single society. The question is what both of 
these differences imply for the redistributivity of the tax and transfer system we 
impose on immigrants. Since we can understand the rights and responsibilities of 
immigrants in part on an associative basis, in other words on the same basis as 
citizens, the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity of tax and 
transfer citizens for citizens should also, broadly speaking, apply to the tax and 
transfer system imposed on immigrants. For instance, immigrants should not be 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of excessive inequality to the extent that the dignity 
of the worst-off is violated, nor should they be left to endure severe hardship. 
However, the redistributivity of the tax and transfer system on immigrants should 
differ in three important ways.  
Firstly, in addition to the upper bound on redistributivity that arises from the 
need to preserve incentives to contribute to the social product, I suggest that a 
distinct but related upper bound applies specifically in the case of immigrants. This 
new upper bound arises from the fact that non-citizen residents do not only choose 
how much effort to put into economically-productive labour once they enter 
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society, but in addition make a prior choice about which society to reside in. In 
contrast, citizens generally do not have a choice concerning the society into which 
they are born, and have to accept the society’s principles and laws as they are.  
The implication is that immigrants who are, for instance, more endowed with 
natural talents may choose to reside in a society that is less redistributive, because 
such a society would permit greater socioeconomic inequality to the benefit of the 
naturally-talented. In these cases, societies that are more redistributive would not 
be able to attract talented immigrants that could increase their social product for 
the benefit of all existing citizens.  
Hence, in the case of immigrants, societies may be forced to strike a different 
balance between avoiding excessive inequality while providing incentives for 
individuals, including immigrants from abroad, to contribute to the social product. 
In other words, the ability of immigrants to choose the society in which they wish 
to reside in constitutes another upper bound on the redistributivity on the tax and 
transfer system that applies to them. This upper bound arises from the recognition 
that the social obligations of immigrants are partially contractual in nature: unlike 
citizens who derive their social obligations from a process of association over which 
they have little control, it is important to recognise that immigrants to some extent 
are able to reduce their contractual obligations to society, because immigrants will 
not enter society unless they choose to consent to the terms of doing so.  
Secondly, I suggest that the lower bound on redistributivity constituted by FEO 
may be weaker in the case of immigrants. As immigrants remain members of their 
home society, they will be able to freely pursue opportunities to develop their 
potential within that society. Hence, it is not incumbent on society to ensure that 
immigrants enjoy the same opportunities to develop their talent as citizens, who 
will not be able to enjoy similar opportunities in a foreign country. Indeed, by 
simply allowing the immigrant to reside in society over the long term, society is 
already expanding the set of opportunities available to these immigrants. The 
crucial point is that while the need to maintain FEO arises from one’s right to 
improve one’s social position, this right is not tied to any society in particular – as 
long as a person has the ability to improve their social position in some society, 
other societies do not have an obligation to provide opportunities for that person. 
Nevertheless, it remains in society’s interest to preserve some equality of 
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opportunity for long-term non-citizen residents, as this will maximise the ability 
of these immigrants to contribute to the social product over the long term. 
Finally, I suggest that the lower bound on redistributivity arising from the 
difference principle is also weakened in the case of immigrants. Here, I refer to the 
earlier discussion in Section C concerning the justification for Rawls’ principles of 
justice, and note that the justification hinges crucially on the hypothetical device 
of the original position. The social rights and responsibilities for citizens must be 
determined from the original position in which citizens do not know their social 
position, because citizens enter society without any control over their social 
position. The difference principle is adopted from the original position, as citizens 
would want to ensure that society’s institutions benefit the worst-off if there was a 
chance that they would enter society in the social position of the worst-off. 86  
However, the same reasoning does not apply to immigrants, who know and 
have some control over their social position at the point they enter society. 
Knowing their existing social position, potential immigrants are in a good position 
to decide if they should migrate to a given society, migrate to a different society 
that would better promote their welfare, or not migrate at all. Unlike citizens 
behind the veil of ignorance who face the possibility of entering society in a poor 
social position, there would be no reason for these immigrants to consider the 
welfare of immigrants who are socioeconomically worst-off.  
Furthermore, it would not be unjust to immigrants who are socioeconomically 
worst-off if they lived in a society not governed by the difference principle, because 
they contractually consented to enter that society knowing the effect of that 
society’s principles on their welfare given their social position. Citizens in a similar 
position, however, would be treated unjustly because they did not choose to enter 
society in the position of the socioeconomically worst-off and are coerced to live 
under regulations that fail to improve their welfare because they are not governed 
by the difference principle. Hence, the difference principle does not apply to 
immigrants, because the crucial context of the original position under which it is 
adopted does not hold in the case of immigrants. 
                                                      
86 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 85-88. 
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In short, it has been shown that the hybrid of the associative and contractual 
models is a good framework for understanding the rights and responsibilities of 
immigrants, who also remain members of their home societies. Given this status of 
immigrants, I suggest that the redistributivity of the tax and transfer system 
imposed on immigrants should broadly be constrained by the Rawlsian upper and 
lower bounds, with tweaks in the aspects of maintaining incentives to contribute 
to the social product, preserving FEO, and upholding the difference principle.  
 
C.      Corporations 
 
The final feature of modern societies I will consider is the prevalence of 
incorporation and how corporations should be taxed in a well-ordered society. 
Although I refer specifically to corporations, the analysis applies to other forms of 
corporate entities and legal persons. Corporations should be understood to include 
partnerships, limited liability partnerships, trusts, business trusts and other legal 
vehicles. To borrow terminology from the taxation of trusts, there are theoretically 
two models which can be applied in the assessment of the legal character of such 
legal vehicles: (1) transparency and (2) personification.87 Most countries apply a 
mix of these two models when considering the tax treatment of these legal vehicles. 
The exact mix will differ depending on the vehicle, but the fundamental concepts 
are the same. Generally, the closer the ‘proximity’ of the vehicle to the beneficial 
owners of their assets, the more transparency will be favoured. However, tax 
avoidance and the resultant anti-avoidance provisions have caused quite a mess in 
this area.  
Thus far, I have discussed the relevance of Rawlsian principles, which concern 
the rights and responsibilities of free and equal citizens in society,88 to both the 
question of how tax burdens should be distributed among citizens and the question 
how the funds raised from taxation should be spent on citizens. It is not clear, 
however, if Rawlsian principles similarly bear on questions concerning how 
companies should be taxed; Rawls’ principles apply only to citizens, which unlike 
                                                      
87 J E Meade, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (London: George, Allen & 
Unwin, 1978) at 401 [The Meade Report]. 
88 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 5. 
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companies, are natural persons. Yet the question of how corporations should be 
taxed is especially pertinent to modern states, which obtain much of their revenue 
from corporate taxation.  
Two questions arise when considering how we can extend Rawlsian principles 
that apply to individuals to corporations. The first question is the extent to which 
corporate tax system should be redistributive, or in other words whether a 
progressive corporate tax should be imposed such that companies that are more 
profitable pay more tax. If corporations, as legal persons, ought to enjoy the same 
rights and responsibilities as natural persons or citizens, then it might follow from 
Rawls’ principles of justice that the upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity 
of the tax and transfer system for individuals would also apply to the corporate tax 
system.  
The second question is whether the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the 
redistributivity of the overall tax and transfer system for individuals have 
implications for the structure of a just corporate tax system. As corporations are 
ultimately owned by citizens and return their profits to their owners who are 
citizens, the structure of corporate taxation would affect the redistributivity of the 
tax and transfer system overall.  
To tackle these two questions, I will first consider the legal status of 
corporations, and focus in particular on the question of a corporation’s personality. 
While the Salomon89 line of cases have established the doctrine of separate legal 
personality in English law beyond a reasonable doubt, there is, in fact, no moral 
reason why this should be necessary.90 To address the issue of what rights and 
responsibilities corporations have and in turn how they should be taxed, we return 
to the two models mentioned earlier: (1) transparency and (2) personification. The 
first model is that of transparency, on which the corporation is treated as nothing 
over and above a group of individuals or stakeholders such as shareholders, 
                                                      
89 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
90 Economic reasons seem to be the issue on the courts’ minds as they have insisted on 
maintaining the doctrine of separate legal personality; notably rejecting attempts to pierce 
the corporate veil. (See VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp [2013] 2 AC 337 
(UKSC) and Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415 (UKSC)). 
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creditors, employees, and the general public.91 Based on this model, the 
corporation has no rights and responsibilities other than the collective total of the 
rights and responsibilities that each of its stakeholders possesses.92  
The second model is that of personification, on which the corporation is treated 
as having independent legal personality, and hence having rights and 
responsibilities over and above and independent of those of its shareholders.93 
What this model implies in terms of taxation is that the profits of the corporation 
should be taxed on two levels: first, the corporation itself pays tax on its profits as 
an independent legal entity; second, shareholders pay tax on the share of post-tax 
profit they receive from the corporation in the form of dividends.  
In contrast, the transparency model entails taxation only on the second level 
and not the first.94 A corporate tax directly levied on companies would not exist; 
corporate profits, as dividends, would be treated no differently from other sources 
of individual income. Indirectly then, corporate tax would be constrained by the 
Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on redistributivity that apply to taxation at the 
level of the individual shareholder.  
Between the transparency and personification models, I suggest that the latter 
should be adopted on practical grounds. Regulating and taxing corporations based 
on the transparency model would require the highly impractical task of exactly 
portioning the rights and responsibilities of each individual stakeholder, or more 
                                                      
91 This fourfold classification is extracted from Companies Act (UK), 2006, c 46, Part 10, 
s172(1), which lists the various parties which the directors of a company must have regard 
to when performing their duties.  
92 The transparency model has been used successfully in the taxation of trusts for a long 
time. In adapting it to the context of the taxation of corporations, the stakeholders are 
analogous to beneficiaries. This is not a perfect analogy. Corporate stakeholders generally 
lack the enforcement rights of beneficiaries. While there is some overlap between the 
fiduciary duties of directors and trustees, the duties of both groups can differ considerably. 
93 The three key types of rules applied specifically to corporations are (1) entity shielding, 
(2) authority, and (3) procedure. (See Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd 
ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 1.2.1). 
94 Readers familiar with tax concepts will recognise that the basic models of transparency 
and personification described here are essentially proposing a single-tier and two-tier tax 
system respectively. However, there is no necessary link between the two sets of concepts 
and legislation may be used to modify the tax consequences. 
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specifically the share of profits received by each individual shareholder. Indeed, the 
rights and responsibilities of modern corporations often cannot be divided in this 
manner across individual stakeholders.95  
A further reason for adopting the personification model is that in practice, 
companies are observed to make decisions as semi-independent agents, and these 
decisions may not be aligned with the interests or wishes of stakeholders.96 As a 
consequence of this, corporate taxes cannot be imposed on the basis of full 
transparency, and some taxation must be imposed directly on corporations. What 
I propose is to treat companies as a hybrid of the two models of transparency or 
personification. I recognise that companies to some extent are independent legal 
entities or persons and should be taxed as such.  
Thus far, I have determined that corporations share the feature of agency with 
citizens and natural persons. However, because they are not natural persons and 
are instead established to further the interests of natural persons, their rights and 
responsibilities are derived from and affect that of natural persons. We are now in 
a position to answer the first of the questions posed earlier: how progressive should 
corporate tax be, and should the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on 
redistribution apply to corporate taxation?  
The answer is no. A large part of the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the 
redistributivity of tax and transfer systems arise out of the status of society’s 
members as free and equal citizens that engage in a reciprocal system of social 
cooperation. However, corporations are not members or citizens of society; instead, 
they are legal persons created by society to serve the collective interests of citizens. 
Hence, we cannot directly apply the upper and lower bounds on redistributivity 
discussed in Part IV to the question of corporate taxation. 
Nevertheless, Rawls’ conception of society does have implications for corporate 
taxation. Since corporate taxation is imposed by the state to raise revenue to 
                                                      
95 Section 172(1) Companies Act 2006 (UK) stops at listing the parties which the directors 
“must have regard to” and does not lay down any concrete methods for determining their 
respective rights. There are many situations where it is difficult to balance the rights of the 
stakeholders and almost impossible to determine their interests in advance. The classic case 
is that of insolvency. (See Keay, “Directors’ Duties and Creditors Interests” (2014) 130 
LQR 443). 
96 Kraakman, supra note 93 at 2.1. 
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provide state services and maintain public institutions, corporate taxation must be 
at a high enough level that it generates sufficient revenue for the state while 
relieving some of the tax burden on individuals. As one of the goals of Rawlsian 
well-ordered societies is to invest and maintain common institutions and provide 
for the common good, corporate taxation to generate state revenue is aligned with 
Rawlsian principles.  
Another implication is that corporate taxation cannot be overly progressive, as 
this would blunt the incentives for companies, as semi-independent agents, to 
contribute to the social product by growing and succeeding. Unlike taxation on 
individuals, however, there would be no need to protect the interests of the most 
unprofitable corporations, as arguments concerning hardship or equality of 
opportunity would not apply to corporations.  
In conclusion, Rawls’ principles suggest that corporate taxation should be 
structured to generate revenue for the state while refraining from being excessively 
progressive in order to preserve the incentive for companies to seek profitability. 
However, Rawls’ principles do not suggest any strict upper or lower bounds on the 
progressivity or redistributivity of corporate taxation, as corporations lack the same 
rights and responsibilities as natural persons.  
Given that the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on redistributivity do not 
apply directly to corporate taxation, we can now consider the second of the 
questions posed above on what implications the upper and lower bounds on the 
redistributivity of the tax and transfer for citizens would have for corporate 
taxation. Here, I acknowledge the key insight of the transparency model: 
corporations are ultimately comprised of individual stakeholders who collectively 
contribute to and have claims on the corporation. Imposing taxation on a 
corporation is indirectly imposing a tax burden on that corporation’s shareholders. 
To that extent, then, the corporate tax system must not violate the Rawlsian 
principles that govern the rights and responsibilities of individual citizens. 
In other words, the corporate tax system should not result in the overall tax and 
transfer system from the perspective of individual citizens being too redistributive 
or not redistributive enough. To illustrate, given that it is usually citizens that are 
better-off that own corporations, imposing a corporate tax structure that taxes 
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companies at an excessively low rate might result in an overall tax and transfer 
system that is not redistributive enough.  
Alternatively, given that a large proportion of sole proprietors are not among 
the better-off in society, imposing high corporate taxes on sole proprietorships may 
result in an overall tax and transfer system that is unjust for the worse-off. In this 
crucial way, the corporate tax system, as one part of the overall tax and transfer 
system, is indirectly constrained by the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the 
redistributivity of the tax and transfer system. Apart from this indirect constraint, 
however, states should be free to impose any corporate tax structure that best 
balances the aims of raising revenue for state expenditure and creating incentives 
for firms to grow the social product.  
With increasing globalisation, many corporations now operate internationally. 
The two main ways of establishing tax jurisdiction over a corporation are by 
showing that they have sufficient links with the state, either through (1) registration 
or (2) carrying out of business (‘permanent establishment’).97 In both cases, the 
position of a corporation is analogous to that of an immigrant, as described above. 
The bases for taxation are associational and contractual; the degree of relevance of 
each depends on the length of time spent with such links to the society and the 
extent to which one interacts with the society.  
Hence, we have concluded in this section that the overall tax and transfer system 
should include, in addition to taxes on individuals, taxes imposed directly on 
corporations. This reflects the personified legal character of corporations. While 
the structure of these corporate taxes is not directly constrained by Rawlsian 
principles which regulate the rights and responsibilities of citizens, they are 
indirectly constrained by the Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the 
redistributivity of the tax and transfer system for individuals. By considering 
corporations, we have made an important modification to the earlier conclusions 
                                                      
97 These are by no means the only concepts applied in establishing tax jurisdiction. The 
Source and Remittance bases are also commonly used, and are in fact the main concepts 
used in Singapore Income Tax Law. See section 10 of the Singapore Income Tax Act (Cap 
134, 2004 Rev Ed Sing). Also see Lim Cher Hui, Pok Soy Yoong & Steven Timms, Case 
Law Guidance on Source of Business and Trade Income, (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2011) at Ch 
2. The Source and Remittance bases also put the corporation in the position analogous to 
that of an immigrant, relying on the associative and contractarian models.  
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about the tax and transfer system, while respecting the framework given by the 
Rawlsian upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity of tax and transfer 
systems.  
 
VI.      CONCLUSION 
 
This article has focused on the implications of Rawls’ principles of justice for the 
extent to which tax and transfer systems should be redistributive. I have defended 
Rawls’ two principles of justice on basic liberties and socioeconomic inequalities, 
and demonstrated that they place upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity 
of tax and transfer systems in a well-ordered society. Specifically, this lower bound 
is justified on the basis of arguments from hardship and dignity that are 
underpinned by the first principle of justice,98 on the basis of arguments from equal 
opportunity and reciprocity that are underpinned by the second principle of 
justice,99 and on the basis of arguments from equal sacrifice and the need to raise 
sufficient revenue that are underpinned by the overall Rawlsian conception of 
society as a system of productive cooperation. The upper bound is justified on the 
basis of arguments from property rights and the need to create incentives for 
individuals to contribute to society; these arguments are grounded in the first and 
second principles of justice respectively. 
Having arrived at this theoretical framework of upper and lower bounds on the 
extent to which tax and transfer systems should be redistributive, I also explored if 
these bounds were relevant given three features of modern society. The first feature 
is that of the worst-off in society being increasingly well-off in absolute terms. In 
this situation, most of the arguments for a lower bound on the level of 
redistributivity remain relevant, and hence the upper and lower bounds on 
redistributivity remain relevant. The second feature is that of globalisation and 
labour mobility. I argued that the overseas income of citizens should be treated no 
differently from their other income. I also argued that the partially-contractarian 
basis of immigrants’ status implies that minor deviations could be made to the 
                                                      
98 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, supra note 4 at 42. 
99 Ibid at 42-43, 245-246. 
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upper and lower bounds on the redistributivity of the tax and transfer system faced 
by these immigrants.  
Finally, I considered the growing contribution of corporate taxation to state 
revenue. I showed that corporations should be treated and taxed on the basis of a 
hybrid model that combines the transparency and personification approaches. It 
follows that corporations should be taxed directly in a manner that best balances a 
set of important social aims, but that this taxation should not have the result that 
the redistributivity of the overall tax and transfer system from the perspective of 
individual citizens transgresses its Rawlsian upper and lower bounds. In 
conclusion, Rawls’ principles of justice impose important constraints on the 
redistributivity of the tax and transfer systems of well-ordered societies. With 
minor modifications, these theoretical constraints are highly relevant for modern 
societies and crucial for guaranteeing the free and equal status of citizens.
